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Abstract 
In China, regional disparities are important. We examine the difference in the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow between firms in inland regions and those in coastal regions. By using the 
financial data of Chinese listed firms, we found that firms in inland regions rely more on their 
internal funds in terms of their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the 
sensitivity gap between inland and coastal firms widened in the recent contractionary monetary 
policy period. This suggests that firms in inland regions are harder to obtain outside funds due to 
unfavorable social and economic environments for inland firms. Our findings suggest that capital 
markets in China respond rationally to the potential impact of regional disparities on a firm’s 
performance. 
JEL Classification O16; G14; G31 
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Regional disparities and investment-cash flow sensitivity:  
Evidence from Chinese listed firms 
1. Introduction 
Listed firms in China are embedded in conspicuous regional disparities.1 In China, the 
regional disparities have an impact on the earnings of listed firms through the following three 
major channels. First, in the context of a political centralized system, firms in West and central 
regions (hereafter, inland regions) carry heavier social burdens than those in the East and coastal 
regions (hereafter, coastal regions).2 Second, under the arrangement of fiscal decentralization, 
listed firms in inland regions bear directly or indirectly more extra charges than those in coastal 
regions.3 Finally, high-quality labor continues to be absorbed by firms in coastal regions and has 
boosted these firms to grow more quickly, but the firms in inland regions have been thwarted by 
the low level of human capital. Consequently, the three foregoing differences might translate into 
performance gaps of a firm, and listed firms in coastal regions tend to perform better than their 
inland counterparts.  
Based on the above, a reasonable deduction is presented as follows. After a capital market 
incorporates the information, firms in inland regions, which have larger uncertainty than those in 
                                                        
1 A long-term unbalanced development strategy (i.e., giving priority to the development of the East and coastal 
regions) has resulted in conspicuous regional disparities, (i.e., rich East and coastal regions and poor West and 
central regions).  
2 For example, there are fewer job opportunities in inland regions, and the State considers employment and social 
stability to be important performance measures used by local officials. Therefore, due to the pressure from local 
officials who are appointed and dismissed by upper level governments, the listed firms in inland regions have to 
hire more redundant workers than those in coastal regions. 
3 The reason is that, in comparison to governments in coastal regions, it is difficult for inland governments to 
collect their own revenues and fulfill the same responsibilities or mandates. 
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coastal areas, tend to face tighter external financing constraints than those in coastal regions in 
terms of their investment decisions. In other words, firms in inland regions might rely more on 
their internal funds in their investment decisions than their coastal counterparts. “Unfortunately, 
the extant research lacks empirical analyses, which are necessary for addressing the deduction 
within the framework of conspicuous regional disparities. We attempt to do this by using the 
Chinese stock market and the financial data of listed firms. 
A number of studies initialed by Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that firms that face tighter 
financing constraints have to rely more on internal funds for making investments.4 However, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) diverge from these studies by showing that 
investment is more sensitive to cash flow for the least financially constrained firms. Allayannis 
and Mozumdar (2004) report that Cleary’s findings can be explained by negative cash flow 
observations, and Kaplan and Zingales’ results are driven by a few outlying observations in a 
small sample. Erickson and Whited (2000) and Alti (2003) argue that the measurement error in 
Tobin’s Q affects the estimated investment-cash flow sensitivity. The authors of other recent 
papers (Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Moyen (2004), Cleary et al. (2007), and Lyandres (2007)) 
develop a different theoretical model and offer some explanations for the previously different 
empirical findings. In addition, Ağca and Mozumdar (2008) find that there is a decline in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity through time and test whether investment-cash flow sensitivity 
should decrease with factors that reduce capital market imperfections. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present data and 
empirical specifications. In Section 3, we provide the empirical results and discuss their robustness. 
                                                        
4 See Hubbard (1999) for a detailed review of this literature. 
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The last section is the conclusion. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Empirical specifications 
Following previous studies (Cleary et al. (2007), Lyandres (2007), and Ağca and Mozumdar 
(2008)), we use a classical cash flow model to explore the impacts of regional disparities on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. To control for possible heteroskedasticity due to differences in 
firm size, we divide both the investment and the cash flow by the net fixed assets (NFA) of the 
previous time period. Specifically, the model is as follows. 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1i t i t i t i t i i tI CF dummyCF Q ,α α α α λ−= + + + + + ε          ⑴ 
Here, Ii, t is defined as the gross investment of firm i for the current year (GIi, t) divided by the 
net fixed assets of the previous time period (=GIi, t / NFAi,t-1). CFi,t is the ratio of firm i’s 
depreciation plus profits after tax for the current year (DPATi,t) to the net fixed assets of the 
previous time period (=DPATi, t / NFAi,t-1). Dummy denotes the regional dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if listed firm i locates in coastal regions and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the coefficient of 
dummyCF (a cross term of CF and regional dummy) indicates the difference of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity between coastal and inland firms. Qt-1 is the lagged one time period Tobin’s Q for 
firm i. Due to the measurement difficulty of the marginal Tobin’s Q, empirical studies usually use 
the average Q. We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Cleary et al. (2008) and 
employ the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the average Q. Specifically, we calculate the 
Chinese Tobin’s Q as follows (Firth et al. (2008)). 
Tobin’s Q=(MVCS+BVPS+BVLTD+BVINV+BVCL-BVCA)/BVTA,  
where MVCS is the market value of the firm’s common stock, BVPS is the book value of the 
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firm’s preferred stock, BVLTD is the book value of firm’s long-term debt, BVINV is the book 
value of the firm’s inventories, BVCL is the book value of the firm’s current liabilities, BVCA is 
the book value of the firm’s current assets, and BVTA is the book value of the firm’s total assets. 
Listed firms in China do not issue preferred stocks. Because, until the recent share reform, listed 
firms issued both tradable and non-tradable shares, we adjust the measurement of Tobin’s Q. 
Specifically, in order to obtain the value of equity in the above formula, we multiply the amount of 
tradable shares by the market price and the amount of non-tradable shares by 30% of the market 
price (Chen and Xiong (2002) and Firth et al. (2008)). 
Based on the fact that ignoring the unobservable factors probably creates an endogenous 
problem and a bias in the estimation results, almost all the previous studies in this field (e.g., 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), and Ağca 
and Mozumdar (2008)) use the firm fixed effects panel regression. We follow them and use the 
fixed-effect (demeaned estimation) panel regression. iλ  and ,i tε  refer to an individual firm 
fixed effect and error term, respectively. 
Previous studies (Allen et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2008)) also suggest that stock returns in 
China are less informative of firm performance than those in developed economies because they 
tend to reflect market-level information rather than firm-specific information. Consequently, 
attention should be given to the potential question of measurement error in Tobin’s Q. Following 
Cleary et al. (2008) and Firth et al. (2008), we employ sales growth (SGi,t) as an alternative proxy 
of firm performance. Here, SGi,t is defined as the ratio of the difference between firm i’s net sales 
in the current year and that in the previous one year to the net sales in the previous one year to 
capture the growth opportunities of a listed firm. If we employ the SGt-1 rather than Tobin’s Qt-1 as 
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the performance of measure, the model is as follows.  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1i t i t i t i t i i tI CF dummyCF SG ,β β β β γ−= + + + + + μ
                                                       
             ⑵ 
2.2 Data and sample description 
We use the sample consisting of 1,412 firms that issue only A shares and are listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China.5 Our data are from the 
China Stock Market and the Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). In China, relatively 
standardized and internationalized financial regulations were introduced and rigorously enforced 
in 1997. Therefore, we construct our data set over the 1998 to 2007 period. To make the sample 
more homogenous, the firms in financial industries are eliminated. Firm-year observations are 
deleted if the value for net fixed assets or sales is zero or if there are missing values for any of the 
five key variables. To avoid distortions arising from mergers and acquisitions, observations with 
sales growth exceeding 100% are eliminated (Cleary et al. (2008)). Extreme values of Tobin’s Q 
exceeding 20 are also deleted. After that, 9,147 firm-year observations are left. We work with an 
unbalanced panel, and our data set covers firms of different sizes and ages from a variety of 
industries. A summary of the statistics of the key variables is presented in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
As is evident from Table 1, the mean investment scaled by the net fixed assets of the overall 
sample, the coastal region sub-sample, and the inland region sub-sample are 0.425, 0.447, and 
 
5 A small proportion of the shares of Chinese listed firms are traded at the same time in mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and the U.S., and a firm has different stock prices simultaneously inside and outside the mainland because 
of capital regulation policies in China. To avoid the measurement question of Tobin’s Q, we exclude these firms. In 
addition, because Hainan province and the Guangxi autonomous region have been lagging far behind other coastal 
provinces in terms of economic development, they are classified as inland regions. 
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0.399, respectively, which indicates that there is a high investment ratio for Chinese listed firms 
and the mean of the investment ratio of firms in coastal regions is slightly higher than that in 
inland regions. The sample average cash flow divided by net fixed assets of firms in coastal 
regions and in inland regions is 0.621 and 0.245, respectively, which demonstrates that the mean 
of the cash flow ratio in coastal firms is much higher than that in inland regions. Based on the 
definition of cash flow, this shows that the performance of coastal firms is probably higher than 
that of firms in inland regions. From the mean and median of the sales growth rate, firms in both 
coastal and inland regions indicated relatively strong growth opportunities during our sample 
period. 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Tests of regional disparities and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
The results of our empirical models based on fixed effects are presented in Table 2. As is 
evident form Equation (1) of Table 1, the coefficient on the cash flow is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level after controlling for investment opportunities. The table shows that 
inland firm investment is significantly correlated with proxies for changes in internal funds. The 
coefficient of interest is related to the dummyCF (the cross term of regional dummy and cash flow 
variables), which allows us to explore whether the regional disparities affect the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity of a firm. The coefficient on dummyCF is -0.572 and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, which shows that ①, the coefficient on the cash flow of coastal firms is 0.085, and 
their investment is also significantly correlated with cash flow, and ②, there is a significant 
sensitivity gap between the inland and the coastal firms. The proxy Tobin’s Q for investment 
opportunities is positive but insignificant. The results of Equation (2) are the same as those of 
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Equation (1). However, the coefficient on Sales Growth SG, another proxy for investment 
opportunities, is negative and insignificant, which indicates, over our sample period, that Tobin’s 
Q is probably a better proxy than Sales Growth. The above findings show that the inland firms 
rely more on internal funds than those in coastal regions and that inland firms face tighter external 
financing constraints than their counterparts in coastal regions. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
3.2 Time series pattern of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
Next, we investigate the time series pattern of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by 
running rolling regressions of Equations (1) and (2) for overlapping periods of five years during 
our sample period. Our first regression is for the period 1998-2002, the second one, for the period 
1999-2003, and so on. We report the results based on the fixed effects model in Table 3. To clearly 
view the time series pattern of the sensitivities, we plot the sensitivity of inland firms, the 
sensitivity of coastal firms, and the sensitivity gap between the two types of firms. Figure 1 
presents the changes of the sensitivities over time.  
As is evident in Table 3, for six rolling equations of the Q performance, all the coefficients on 
CF in six regressions are positive and statistically strongly significant at the 1% level. The results 
show that, after controlling for investment opportunities, the internal funds of a Chinese firm in 
inland regions play an important role in investment decisions. The solid curve in Fig. 1-A depicts 
the six coefficients’ time series pattern. The curve indicates that inland firm sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow falls slowly for a long time before ascending steeply. 
All six coefficients on the dummyCF are negative, which is consistent with our expectations. 
These results indicate that, in comparison to inland firms, coastal firms faced weaker external 
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financing constraints over the sample period. The first three coefficients are insignificant, but the 
last three are significant at the 1% level. The six coefficients on dummyCF, which capture the 
sensitivity gap between the inland and coastal firms, are plotted in Fig. 1-B. The solid curve of the 
sensitivity gap has two components. The first is nearly a horizontal segment up to the last rolling 
period. In this range, the two types of firms maintain a steady sensitivity gap. The second is 
steeply downright-sloping, which indicates that, in comparison to coastal firms, firms in inland 
regions are forced to rely heavily on internal funds during the last rolling period. The solid curve 
of Fig. 1-C tells us that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow in coastal firms depicts the same 
time pattern as that in the inland regions in Fig. 1-A. The last sensitivity estimates of inland firms 
and coastal firms are 0.993 and 0.280, respectively, which results in a wider difference between 
them, reflected by the sharp drop in the gap curve in the figure.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
Insert Fig. 1 here. 
We will now examine the reasons for the results above. Although capital markets in China are 
still nascent, they have been growing quickly. During this process of growth, more financial 
instruments continued to be introduced, and the informational imperfections in the capital markets 
continued being reduced.” This has lowered the external financing constraints and mitigated the 
reliance of firms on internal funds. Therefore, the sensitivities of investment to cash flow in both 
inland and coastal firms tended to fall gradually, as described by the slowly downright-sloping 
segment of the sensitivity curves in Fig. 1-A and C. The result is consistent with that in Ağca and 
Mozumdar (2008), who argue, using the data of U.S. manufacturing firms, that investment-cash 
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flow sensitivity decreases with five factors that reduce capital-market imperfections.6 
The reasons that the sensitivity curves in Fig. 1-A and C rise steeply during the last rolling 
period are as follows. To suppress speculative activities in the real estate market since 2004, 
China’s central bank (PBOC) raised the required reserve deposit ratio 14 times from 7% in April 
2004 to 14.5% in December 2007.7 The banking sector, which has undergone management 
reforms pursuing a value-maximizing target, has to make it difficult for both inland and coastal 
firms to obtain external loans.8 In addition, the Chinese financial system has been dominated by a 
large state-own banking sector (Allen et al. (2008)), and there is significant reliance on bank loan 
finance by Chinese listed firms (Firth et al. (2008)). Hence, we observe a recent steeply rising 
segment in the sensitivity curves in Fig. 1-A and C. 
Figure 1-B captures the sensitivity gap between both coastal and inland firms. After capital 
markets acquire the information that the performance of firms in coastal regions is probably better 
than that of those in inland regions, they prefer to offer help to coastal firms that are short of funds 
rather than to those in inland regions. The disparity of external financial costs begins to widen. As 
compared to firms in coastal regions, firms in inland regions have to rely more on their internal 
funds regarding their investment decisions, and, therefore, their sensitivity of investment to cash 
                                                        
6 These five factors are increasing fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst following, antitakeover 
amendments, and the existence of bond rating. 
7 Specifically, these increases were from 7.0% to 7.5% in April 2004, 7.5% to 9.0% (0.5% every time) in 2006, 
and 9.0% to 14.5% (0.5% every time) in 2007. 
8 After China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, the banking sector continued to face increasing pressure 
from the competition of foreign financial institutions and to experience many important reforms. In 2005 and 2006, 
three of the Big Four banks (BOC, PCBC, and ICBC) successfully partially privatized, accepted investment from 
foreign financial organizations, which were subject to the 25% restriction of foreign ownership, and issued IPOs 
outside mainland China. The fourth (ABC) will be partially privatized in the near future. 
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flow is higher than it is for firms in coastal regions. Interestingly, the sensitivity gap remains 
nearly constant until the last rolling sample period. During the last rolling sample of continuously 
and strictly contractionary monetary policy, banks experiencing continuous management reforms 
have to give priority to allocating scarce credit funds to firms in coastal regions. Although both 
types of firms face more external financial constraints over the last rolling period, the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms in inland regions rises more quickly than it does for the 
coastal firms. 
3.3 Robustness tests 
Because of the potential question of a measurement error in Tobin’s Q, we substitute another 
financial variable (sales growth) for Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities. The results 
of sales growth measurement are consistent with those of Tobin’s Q measurement. In addition, our 
previous results were based on a rolling regression for an overlapping period of five years. 
Moreover, when we change the overlapping period (6 years, 7 years and 8 years),9 the previous 
results remain unchanged.10 This indicates that our results are robust.  
In order to test our findings of robustness further, we choose a typical industry, such as 
manufacturing, and use that data from our sample. The empirical results and the time series pattern 
of sensitivities are provided in Tables 4 and 5 and Fig. 2.  
Insert Table 4 here. 
Insert Table 5 here. 
                                                        
9 The definition of sales growth SGt-1 and Equation (2) decide our whole adjusted sample of 8 years, i.e., 2000 to 
2007. 
10 For space reasons, we do not report the tables for other overlapping periods. These tables are available on 
request. 
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Insert Fig. 2 here. 
As is evident from Table 4, the investment of both firms in inland and coastal areas is 
significantly correlated with their cash flow at the 1% level, and there is still a significant 
sensitivity gap at the 1% level. In addition, although the coefficients of Tobin’s Q and sales growth 
SG are positive, the former is significant at the 1% level, but the latter is insignificant, which 
indicates, for the manufacturing industry, that Tobin’s Q is probably a better proxy for investment 
opportunities than sales growth. Figures 2-A and C show the same time series pattern of sensitivity 
as that in Fig. 1-A and C. The patterns of the sensitivity gap in Fig. 2-B are not fully consistent, as 
a sharp increase of the gap is not found when SG is used. However, as the other results remain 
qualitatively unchanged, our findings are robust with regard to the manufacturing industry. 
4. Conclusions 
To our knowledge, there is no extant research on the impact of conspicuous regional 
disparities on investment-cash flow sensitivity. The main goal of our paper is to try to help fill the 
gap in the literature by addressing the issue of investment-cash flow sensitivity using Chinese 
financial data of listed firms. Our empirical results suggest that firms in inland regions rely more 
on their internal funds in their investment activities than those in coastal regions and that the 
sensitivity gap between inland firms and coastal firms becomes wider under contractionary 
monetary policy. This suggests that regional disparities have a statistically significant impact on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and that it is more difficult for firms in inland regions to obtain 
outside funds, such as those from capital markets. Our findings indicate that capital markets in 
China rationally reflect regional disparities. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 Panel A Whole observations Panel B Observations of the Costal Regions Panel C Observations of the Inland Regions 
 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
deviation
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
deviation
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Investment I 0.425 0.174 0.000 222.295 3.104 0.447 0.181 0.000 222.295 3.853 0.399 0.162 0.000 91.358 1.934 
Cash Flow CF 0.444 0.205 -102.314 341.74 5.312 0.621 0.232 -102.314 341.740 7.120 0.245 0.181 -13.542 51.350 1.646 
Tobin’s Q 1.300 1.008 0.004 13.505 1.032 1.268 0.982 0.021 13.500 1.009 1.335 1.043 0.004 13.505 1.057 
Sales Growth SG 0.265 0.151 -1.071 31.619 1.055 0.275 0.153 -1.071 29.858 1.053 0.253 0.150 -1.000 31.619 1.058 
The table provides the summary statistics. Investment and cash flow are normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period. 
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Table 2 
Empirical results for Equations (1) and (2) over the whole sample period 
 Constant CF dummyCF Q SG 
# of  
Obs.
# of  
Firms 
Adjusted
R2 
Equation 
(1) 
0.297 
(4.277)***
0.657 
(17.070)*** 
-0.572 
(-14.621)*** 
0.022 
(0.398)
 7256 1240 0.279 
Equation 
(2) 
0.301 
(8.821)***
0.652 
(15.733)*** 
-0.543 
(-12.237)*** 
 
-0.028 
(-0.850)
5813 1148 0.432 
The values reported herein are the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models of (1) and (2) over the 
whole sample period. Investment normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period is the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables are the cash flow normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period, 
dummyCF, and either Tobin’s Q (in Equation (1)) or Sales growth SG (in Equation (2)). 
t-statistics in brackets. ***, **, and *: significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Empirical results for Equations (1) and (2) for the manufacturing industry during the whole sample period 
 Constant CF dummyCF Q SG 
# of  
Obs.
# of  
Firms 
Adjusted
R2 
Equation 
(1) 
0.220 
(14.551)***
0.220 
(15.288)*** 
-0.205 
(-13.547)***
0.083 
(6.551)***
 4523 734 0.251 
Equation 
(2) 
0.285 
(39.877)***
0.094 
(5.997)*** 
-0.083 
(-5.102)*** 
 
0.008 
(1.013)
3679 717 0.182 
The values reported herein are the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models of (1) and (2) for the 
manufacturing industry during the whole sample period. Investment normalized by the net fixed assets of a 
previous time period is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the cash flow normalized by the net 
fixed assets of a previous time period, dummyCF, and either Tobin’s Q (in Equation (1)) or Sales growth SG (in 
Equation (2)). 
t-statistics in brackets. ***, **, and *: significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Empirical results for Equations (1) and (2) over the five-year rolling sample period 
 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 
CF 0.167 
(3.838)***
0.037 
(1.624)*
0.118 
(3.965)***
0.044 
(2.701)***
0.098 
(3.548)***
0.046 
(3.495)***
0.040 
(2.536)***
0.044 
(2.775)***
0.080 
(2.872)***
0.005 
(0.177) 
0.993 
(15.051)***
1.046 
(16.136)***
dummyCF -0.062 
(-1.410) 
0.008 
(0.250) 
-0.030 
(-0.990)
-0.020 
(-1.174) 
-0.014 
(-0.519)
-0.017 
(-1.223) 
-0.041 
(-2.561)***
-0.044 
(-2.638)***
-0.100 
(-3.413)***
-0.046 
(-1.444) 
-0.713 
(-9.975)***
-0.821 
(-11505)***
Q 0.068 
(1.365) 
 0.078 
(2.036)**
 0.092 
(2.511)***
 0.126 
(6.518)***
 -0.030 
(-0.725) 
 -0.251 
(-1.842)*
 
SG
 
-0.002 
(-0.141) 
 0.005 
(0.376) 
 0.006 
(0.646) 
 0.001 
(0.071) 
 -0.006 
(-0.315) 
 -0.060 
(-1.104) 
constant 0.270 
(3.481)***
0.356 
(24.530)***
0.262 
(4.542)***
0.347 
(29.175)***
0.252 
(4.872)***
0.332 
(33.178)***
0.223 
(8.992)***
0.326 
(30.079)***
0.386 
(9.147)***
0.333 
(19.482)***
0.455 
(3.488)***
0.240 
(4.855)***
# of Obs. 2600 1702 3414 2384 3728 3153 4059 3456 4337 3815 4656 4111 
# of Firms 882 744 970 821 1034 920 1100 970 1124 1047 1192 1091 
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.475 0.297 0.318 0.257 0.234 0.279 0.127 0.169 0.102 0.251 0.415 
The values reported herein are the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models of (1) and (2) over the five-year rolling sample period. Investment normalized by the net fixed assets of a 
previous time period is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the cash flow normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period, dummyCF, and either Tobin’s Q (in 
Equation (1)) or Sales growth SG (in Equation (2)). 
t-statistics in brackets. ***, **, and *: significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Fig. 1 Time series pattern of the sensitivity of investment-cash flow for the entire sample  
Investment is regressed on cash flow CF, dummyCF, and Tobin’s Q or sales growth SG over five-year periods from 1998 to 2007, i.e., 1998-2002, 1999-2003, and so on. The sensitivity 
value (A and C) or gap value (B) is on the vertical axis, and the numeral on the horizontal axis indicates the rolling sample periods, for example, the period 1998-2002 is shown as 1, 
1999-2003 as 2, and so forth.  
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C Sensitivity of coastal firms over manufacturing industry 
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Fig. 2 Time series pattern of the sensitivity of investment-cash flow for the manufacturing industry  
Investment is regressed on cash flow CF, dummyCF, and Tobin’s Q or sales growth SG over five-year periods from 1998 to 2007, i.e., 1998-2002, 1999-2003, and so on. The sensitivity 
value (A and C) or gap value (B) is on the vertical axis, and the numeral on the horizontal axis indicates the rolling sample periods, for example, the period 1998-2002 is shown as 1, 
1999-2003 as 2, and so forth.  
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Table 5 
Empirical results for Equations (1) and (2) for the manufacturing industry during the five-year rolling sample period 
 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 
CF 0.024 
(0.885)
0.001 
(0.043)
0.057 
(2.355)**
0.026 
(1.045)
0.068 
(2.981)***
0.060 
(2.732)***
0.066 
(2.933)***
0.062 
(2.977)***
0.016 
(0.745)
0.023 
(1.126) 
0.279 
(16.060)***
0.093 
(5.078)***
dummyCF 0.024 
(0.641) 
0.005 
(0.144) 
-0.052 
(-2.129)**
-0.023 
(-0.924) 
-0.064 
(-2.708)***
-0.056 
(-2.497)** 
-0.060 
(-2.600)***
-0.056 
(-2.621)***
-0.011 
(-0.462)
-0.017 
(-0.816) 
-0.164 
(-7.282)***
-0.006 
(-0.284)
Q 0.064 
(2.293)** 
 0.080 
(3.616)***
 0.097 
(4.864)***
 0.126 
(6.926)***
 0.135 
(6.258)***
 -0.027 
(-1.483)
 
SG
 
0.004 
(0.238) 
 0.011 
(0.674) 
 0.011 
(0.772) 
 -0.002 
(-0.189) 
 0.004 
(0.404) 
 0.004 
(0.513) 
constant 0.286 
(6.808)***
0.359 
(24.489)***
0.267 
(8.355)***
0.346 
(27.244)***
0.249 
(9.232)***
0.331 
(30.660)***
0.215 
(9.583)***
0.315 
(32.956)***
0.194 
(9.158)***
0.284 
(35.256)***
0.289 
(16.813)***
0.253 
(40.009)***
# of Obs. 1569 1035 2076 1466 2315 1953 2564 2178 2772 2440 2954 2644 
# of Firms 527 448 581 495 629 558 686 601 713 667 719 696 
Adjusted R2 0.359 0.474 0.289 0.327 0.280 0.250 0.260 0.204 0.289 0.196 0.429 0.350 
The values reported herein are the estimates obtained from the firm fixed effect models of (1) and (2) for the manufacturing industry during the five-year rolling sample period. Investment 
normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the cash flow normalized by the net fixed assets of a previous time period, 
dummyCF, and either Tobin’s Q (in Equation (1)) or Sales growth SG (in Equation (2)). 
t-statistics in brackets. ***, **, and *: significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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